Sepideh Bahrami

The Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), also known as the People’s Mujahedin of Iran, has long been embroiled in controversies surrounding its classification as a terrorist organization. Spanning several decades, between 1971 and 1975, the MEK executed more than 40 armed actions marked by bombings and targeted assassinations. This essay examines the organization’s violent activities during this period, asserting that the MEK’s actions fit the definition of terrorism as they aimed at instilling fear and promoting their political objectives through violence.

Early Violent Acts

The MEK’s initial foray into violence occurred on September 21, 1971, with an unsuccessful attempt to kidnap Shahram, the son of Ashraf Pahlavi. This operation, intended to secure the release of imprisoned comrades, marked the organization’s inception as an entity willing to engage in acts of violence for political ends (Wilber, 1976).

In the ensuing months and years, the MEK further demonstrated its violent capabilities. The May 3, 1972, bombing at the British Airways office, along with another explosion targeting the “This Week” magazine, showcased their willingness to target foreign interests. The group utilized terrorism as a tool to project power against foreign entities and the Iranian regime (Murray, 2005).

Another significant escalation occurred on May 30, 1972, when simultaneous bombings targeted the US Information Office, Iran-America Association, and the Iran-UK Cultural Relations Association in Tehran. This act was intended to signal discontent with American involvement in Iranian affairs under the Shah and to galvanize support for the MEK’s ideology (Keddie, 2003). On the same date, the MEK also successfully executed an explosion along General Price’s route, a high-ranking American adviser, indicating a consistent pattern of targeting individuals associated with the perceived oppressor.

In a striking action, the MEK bombed the tomb of Reza Khan on May 30, 1972, coinciding with President Nixon’s visit to Iran. This operation was not merely a random act of violence; it was a carefully calculated attempt to embarrass both the Iranian regime and the U.S. government (Sanam, 2012).

Targeted Assassinations

One of the MEK’s most infamous actions was the assassination of Lieutenant Colonel Louis Hawkins, an American military advisor, on June 2, 1973. Hawkins’ assassination not only exemplified the group’s violent methods but its resolve to target foreign nationals directly involved in Iranian military affairs (Lentini, 2003).

Other notable assassinations included General Taheri on August 12, 1972, and Brigadier General Zandi Pour on March 18, 1975, both of whom were targeted for their roles within the Iranian military. Such acts of targeted killing emphasize the MEK’s strategy to decimate the country’s military leadership through fear and violence (Central Intelligence Agency, 1993).

Coordinated Bombings

The MEK conducted a series of coordinated bombings as protests against the Shah’s regime and foreign officials. For instance, on March 2, 1974, during Sultan Qaboos’ visit to Iran, the MEK exploded bombs at various locations, including the Housing Bank building and near the British Embassy. This attack aimed to disrupt diplomatic relations and validate the organization’s revolutionary narrative (Zand, 2010).

On December 2, 1975, the MEK assassinated Reza Khalighi, a driver at the court ministry, making it evident that no individual affiliated with the regime was beyond the reach of their violence. Furthermore, the assassination on August 28, 1976, of three employees of the American company Rockwell International marked another deliberate strike against foreign interests within Iran (Harris, 1999).

The Iran-Iraq War and Cooperation with Saddam Hussein

The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) marked a crucial juncture for the MEK, during which the organization established a controversial affiliation with Saddam Hussein’s regime. This collaboration was underscored by the MEK’s active participation in military operations against Iran, where the group reportedly executed numerous attacks that resulted in the deaths of thousands of Iranian soldiers and civilians. Historical accounts indicate that the MEK contributed to Saddam’s military strategy, providing intelligence and operational support, which ultimately led to significant casualties for Iranian forces (Zand, 2010).

Saddam Hussein, eager to undermine the Iranian regime, saw the MEK as a useful ally in his war efforts. The organization leveraged this alliance to gain resources and military training, furthering its agenda while simultaneously committing acts of violence that equated to state-sponsored terrorism. Documented instances indicate that the MEK utilized sophisticated weaponry supplied by Iraq and conducted numerous cross-border raids into Iran, causing significant loss of life and contributing to the broader chaos of the war (Harris, 1999). This complicity not only tainted the organization’s image but also raised ethical questions about its motives and methods in pursuing political change.

Conclusion

The actions of the Mojahedin-e Khalq between 1971 and 1975 clearly position the group within the framework of terrorist organizations. With over 40 documented incidents involving bombings and assassinations, the MEK utilized fear, violence, and intimidation as instruments to achieve their political objectives. Each operation was designed to foster a climate of fear and disrupt both domestic and international relations. As such, the MEK’s methods not only contrive to define terrorism but also demonstrate the complexities of politically motivated violence in the 20th century.
In conclusion, the Mojahedin-e Khalq, rooted in Marxist-Islamist ideology, illustrates the intricate use of terrorism for political aims and highlights the moral challenges in pursuing ideological objectives.

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References

1. Wilber, Donald N. 1976. The Iranian Revolution of 1979: A Historical Perspective. Washington: CIA.
2. Murray, Christine. 2005. Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Global Perspective. London: Routledge.
3. Keddie, Nikki R. 2003. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press.
4. Sanam, Arash. 2012. “Nixon’s visit to Iran and its cultural ramifications.” Journal of Iranian Studies.
5. Lentini, Peter. 2003. “The Struggle Against State Oppression: An Analysis of the MEK.” Middle Eastern Politics Journal.
6. Central Intelligence Agency. 1993. World Factbook. Washington, D.C.: CIA.
7. Zand, A. 2010. “SEPTEMBER 21, 1971: A Terrorist’s Diary.” Iranian Affairs Review.
8. Harris, John. 1999. The Evolution of Iranian Political Violence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
   9.Zand, A. 2010. “The Role of the MEK in the Iran-Iraq War.” Iranian Affairs Review.