Cyrus Parsa

Mossadegh: A Narcissistic Demagogue

 Mossadegh was a stubborn, single-minded, and manipulative leader. Perhaps it’s more accurate to call him “deceived by the public,” as he constantly considered public opinion about his image in every political action and reaction. He couldn’t tolerate any damage to the image he had crafted and his followers had polished.

 In his prime, he portrayed himself as sick and in pain, craving the sympathy and compassionate gaze of the nation towards the “Old Man of Ahmadabad.” He was sharp and vocal when it suited him but would faint at the slightest threat to his “national dignity.”

 He couldn’t accept Mohammad Reza Shah’s popularity, viewing the young Shah’s national trust, democratic conduct, and modernizing efforts as a potential threat to his own sacred halo. Therefore, he tried to control the young Shah and make his reign dependent on Mossadegh’s approval.

 Mossadegh, Oil Nationalization, and “National Dignity”

 The nationalization of the oil industry was undoubtedly one of the most significant events in Iran’s contemporary history, fulfilling the long-held dream of independence from foreign colonial powers. However, comparing Mossadegh with the late General Razmara reveals the stark contrast between a pragmatic politician and an idealistic, populist leader.

 

General Razmara, a knowledgeable patriot and realist, believed that making a hasty decision to nationalize the oil industry without proper infrastructure, trained personnel, and technological know-how would be a massive betrayal of national interests, leading to various crises.

 On the other hand, Mossadegh, despite being a distinguished lawyer and a steadfast defender of national rights in parliament, preferred to ride the wave of public emotion. He avoided any negotiations to maintain his “national dignity,” even if it meant economic ruin. For Mossadegh, nothing was as valuable as his national image.

 General Razmara sought a new horizon by aligning with the U.S. and reaching a 50-50 agreement with Britain, emphasizing training Iranian personnel and reducing foreign staff. This agreement would allow Iran to inspect company records and oversee oil sales and exports. Unfortunately, Razmara’s sensible proposals were drowned out by the parliament’s noise.

 Mossadegh rejected Razmara’s proposal vehemently, leading to Razmara’s assassination by the Fadaiyan Islam. This political murder delighted Mossadegh and his National Front supporters, sealing the fate of Iran’s oil industry in a tense and bloody atmosphere.

 Mossadegh’s stubbornness led to the economic bankruptcy of the country. The government couldn’t pay its employees and resorted to printing money illegally.

The 28 Mordad Tragedy and the Shadow of 22 Bahman

Mossadegh’s supporters and the 1979 revolutionaries claim that “the Shah was a dictator who created a single-party state and imprisoned his opponents.” However, before 1953, such accusations didn’t exist, and Mossadegh praised Mohammad Reza Shah as a democratic king.

 The shift towards absolute monarchy can be traced back to the events of 1953 and the history of the leftist movement in Iran. On August 25, Mossadegh, knowing the Shah had the constitutional power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, ignored Dr. Sadiqi’s warning and held a referendum to dissolve the parliament. 

 On August 23, the Shah issued a decree dismissing Mossadegh and appointing Zahedi. Mossadegh then demanded the Shah accept the illegal dissolution of parliament and call for new elections, which the Shah refused. On August 25, Colonel Nassiri delivered the dismissal order to Mossadegh, who had him arrested. That day, Mossadegh announced the dissolution of parliament to the nation.

 On August 26, Mossadegh’s close ally, Hossein Fatemi, published a call to overthrow the monarchy and execute the Shah. Fatemi’s inflammatory language and threats intensified the political crisis.

 Given Mossadegh’s radical and lawless approach, coupled with the leftist and religious factions’ violent and subversive actions, it was almost inevitable that the Shah had to adopt an iron-fisted policy to maintain control and pursue his modernizing agenda.

The Dark Legacy of Mossadegh

 Mossadegh’s most detrimental legacy was establishing two destructive myths that misled several generations of Iranians. First, the belief that Mossadegh was a democratically elected prime minister, making his dismissal illegal and a coup against the rule of law. Second, the notion that the Shah should reign but not rule, a misinterpretation of the constitution that fueled the 1979 revolution.

 In reality, Mossadegh was appointed by the Shah, not elected by the people, and he often acted autocratically, unable to tolerate opposition, as evidenced by the assassination of Razmara. The constitutional power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister belonged to the Shah, a fact that Mossadegh and his followers either ignored or misinterpreted.

 Mossadegh’s failure to form a coherent political party and his antagonism towards the Shah laid the groundwork for the rise of the 1979 revolution. His actions nurtured a broad coalition of anti-Shah forces, including communists, terrorists, and Khomeini’s followers.

The seeds of the 1979 revolution were sown in the events of 1952 and 1953. Mossadegh’s ideology and actions inadvertently paved the way for Khomeini and the Islamic Republic, leading to a national catastrophe that continues to haunt Iran.

Mossadegh’s legacy is a cautionary tale of how misguided leadership and populist rhetoric can undermine national interests and lead to long-term instability and suffering.