Dan Linnaeus

Farnaz Fassihi’s recent “Gift Article” in The New York Times serves as a covert piece of track-two diplomacy for the Islamic Republic, subtly shaping Western narratives to portray the regime as evolving and approachable. Fassihi begins by painting a sympathetic picture of Iran’s president-elect, Masoud Pezeshkian, highlighting his personal grief and unconventional public displays of emotion. This portrayal attempts to humanize Pezeshkian and depict him as a modern leader committed to progressive values, a stark departure from typical Iranian political figures, aimed at softening the Islamic Republic’s image in the West.

Fassihi’s narrative crafts an image of Pezeshkian as a reformist who endured personal tragedy, raised his children as a devoted widower, and remained committed to his medical profession. These elements are designed to evoke empathy and suggest a leader who can be trusted to stand by his promises, much like he stood by his family.

However, this sympathetic portrayal masks the reality of Pezeshkian’s political alignment and the Iranian regime’s unchanged objectives.

Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) Senior Iran and Financial Economics Advisor, Saeed Ghasseminejad, stated this week, “The mullah lobby claims that Pezeshkian is a reformist and that Washington should offer him concessions — even more than those already made. However, Pezeshkian is neither moderate nor a reformist,” [1].

In fact, Iran’s president-elect, Masoud Pezeshkian pledged comprehensive support for Hamas until their aspirations are achieved and Jerusalem is liberated in a letter to Hamas politburo leader Ismail Haniyeh last week. Following this letter, Haniyeh expressed gratitude for Iran’s support in a call with the Iranian president two days ago, on July 14, [Ibid].

Pezeshkian also spoke with Mahdi al-Mashat, leader of Yemen’s Houthi rebels, praising Yemen’s military operations targeting Israel-linked ships and expressing commitment to expanding ties with the Houthis, [Ibid]. Since then, the Houthis have targeted three commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Mediterranean. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency informed Reuters this week that the Houthi attacks since the start of the Gaza conflict have affected at least 65 countries and numerous energy and shipping companies, [2].

Despite Fassihi’s overtures of a diplomatic opening, Pezeshkian’s pledges of support to militant groups like Hamas and the Houthi rebels in Yemen reveal his continued adherence to hardline policies. This duplicitous approach is evident as Fassihi emphasizes Pezeshkian’s supposed pragmatism and reformist agenda while glossing over his loyalty to the regime’s theocratic and oppressive structure.

—— Fingerprints of Iranian Influence Operations: Ali Vaez, the ICG and the Iranian Foreign Ministry

Ali Vaez’s quoted endorsement of Pezeshkian further underscores Fassihi’s intent to mislead Western audiences.

Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group (ICG) has recently come under a new wave of scrutiny due to a previously undisclosed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 2016 with the Iranian regime’s think tank, the Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) which operates under the supervision of Iran’s foreign ministry, [3].

Notably, the newly uncovered MoU was signed pursuant to the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s earlier recruitment efforts of ICG’s senior analysts, Ali Vaez and Dina Esfandiary into the Iran Experts Initiative (IEI) in 2014—a covert influence operation exposed through leaked emails of the Iranian Foreign Ministry in September, 2023.

This initiative sought to build a network of influential academics and researchers abroad who were tasked with publishing opinion pieces, engaging in media appearances, participating in conferences to promote narratives favorable to Iran’s geopolitical interests, and directly influencing the P5+1 nuclear negotiations.

Under Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s leadership between 2013 and 2021, the IEI which sought to shape foreign policy debates, create a more positive perception of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its regional policies and covertly influence U.S. policy towards Iran, has become the subject of recent hearings and inquiries in Washington.

The ICG-IPIS 2016 MoU, facilitated regular off-the-record workshops and quarterly visits for Crisis Group analysts to meet with Iranian officials. It also enabled annual visits to Iran by Crisis Group’s executive officers and board members, facilitated by IPIS through visa assistance and arranging meetings. Robert Malley was involved with the Crisis Group during this period and became President and CEO in January 2018.

Robert Malley and Ali Vaez were key figures in the team that negotiated the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) under Kerry’s leadership as Secretary of State during the Obama administration.

Vaez’s mentor, Robert Malley, was appointed as President Biden’s Special Envoy to Iran in 2021 before being stripped of his security clearance and investigated by the FBI for his handling of classified information a few months after the Iran Experts Initiative story broke late last year.

The ICG’s formal agreement with IPIS brought to light significant ethical and legal concerns, especially considering that since its inception in 1983, IPIS has demonstrated a history of promoting narratives that contradict U.S., NATO interests, and international norms.

A particularly troubling instance is the International Conference to Review the Global Vision of the Holocaust, organized by IPIS under the leadership of then foreign minister Rasoul Mousavi in December 2006. This event was widely denounced for propagating antisemitism by providing a platform for figures who openly questioned the genocide of Jewish people during World War II under the guise of fostering open discussion.

Moreover, it is notable that the former Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif (2013-2012), is serving as a foreign policy adviser to Masoud Pezeshkian, initially using his expertise and extensive book of contacts in the west to support Pezeshkian’s campaign, and continually shaping the Iranian president-elect’s foreign policy views and strategies. Zarif’s role, which includes public appearances and engagements to discuss and promote their foreign policy agenda, is focused on the potential economic benefits of international diplomacy and renegotiating the nuclear deal.

During Pezeshkian’s campaign for instance, in an interview with BBC Persian on June 30, Zarif’s 2014-IEI recruit, Ali Vaez, explained that Pezeshkoian’s rival, Saeed Jalili, known for his ultraconservative stance and previous role as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, would be bad for any prospect of a new nuclear deal. A member of the Expediency Discernment Council Jalili is known for his hardline stance in Iranian politics where he has participated in previous elections and is closely associated with the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Vaez explains that the chances of the snapback mechanisms being triggered before they are set to expire in 2025 are much higher should the regime select him for office, [4].

Vaez’s interview came to the backdrop of the E3 (France, Germany, and the U.K.) recently indicating readiness to reverse their stance on the JCPOA snapback mechanisms which allows for the re-imposition of sanctions if Iran is found to be in non-compliance with its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA; a default measure set to fully expire in 2025, [5].

Fassihi, by presenting Vaez as a credible voice, despite his and the International Crisis Group’s recruitment by the Iranian Foreign Ministry under Zarif and their ties with IPIS, aims to legitimize her narrative. However, for familiar observers this thinly veiled effort merely scores Fassihi a notch as an Iranian mouthpiece.

—— Strategic Timing and the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Exposure of the Iranian Regime’s Assassination Plots

Notably, Fassihi’s article comes on the heels of Politico publishing findings today about Iranian plots to assassinate former President Donald Trump. According to the report, the U.S. intelligence community has gathered increasing evidence that Iran is actively working on such plots, particularly leading up to the upcoming election in November, [6].

The Iranian regime has issued denials, but as senior analyst for FDD, Richard Goldberg noted today, “Donald Trump is an existential threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Tehran can deny the plot all it wants. But we already know of active plots against several former Trump officials. And the regime knows maximum pressure will return,” [7].

Jason Brodsky of United Against a Nuclear Iran (UANI) observed this history of thwarted Iranian assassination plots: “What has gone unreported here is the history of Iran’s regime risking mass casualty attacks in its assassination plots. See for example the 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in a Georgetown restaurant that could have killed U.S. officials and others in that same restaurant. There was also the 2018 bomb plot outside Paris that could have killed scores of foreign officials and Iranian dissidents. Thus the Trump rallies may be targets of interest to Tehran,” [8].

— Expanded Monitoring and Legislative Pressure on the Iranian Regime’s Activities

The Congressional Record of June 13, 2024, presents a detailed account of legislative proceedings concerning the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2025 characterized by a clear intensification in the U.S. legislative stance towards Iran and its influence operations, [9]. Amendment No. 158 offered by Mr. Higgins of Louisiana focused, among several key items strengthening the U.S. posture to counter Iran’s regional ambitions, inclused enhanced reporting requirements on the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).

The MOIS’ addition to the entities to be covered in the report, alongside the IRGC is significant as it broadens the scope of the report to include intelligence operations, which are crucial for understanding the full spectrum of Iran’s military and covert activities. The amendment also requires the inclusion of details on disinformation operations, recruitment of local assets, and targeting of U.S. nationals and foreign dissidents, highlighting concerns about Iran’s non-conventional warfare tactics.

— Election Interference Efforts of the Iranian Regime: The National Intelligence Council’s declassified report on Foreign Threats to the 2022 U.S. midterm elections.

The National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) declassified report provides details on the operations of Iranian, Russian, Chinese, and other actors in the US focused on influencing or interfering with the US elections in 2022. The most exceptional revelations from the “Foreign Threats to the 2022 U.S. Elections” report pertain to the scope and sophistication of the influence operations conducted by major state actors like Russia and Iran, and China’s relative strategic restraint, [10].

With respect to Iranian Operations the report notes the regime engaged in multi-pronged covert influence operations aimed at sowing discord in the United States and undermining public confidence in the US electoral process.

These efforts primarily utilized state-controlled media, proxy websites, and social media accounts to spread misinformation, amplify social discord, and promote narratives favorable to Iranian interests. A notable case study in the report details how Iranian actors used a network of fake social media profiles to disseminate misinformation about the security of the US voting systems. This campaign was designed to erode trust in the electoral infrastructure by promoting narratives that the 2022 elections could be easily rigged or compromised.

“Iranian actors leveraged digital avatars and sophisticated spoofing techniques to masquerade as legitimate American entities, sowing discord through divisive content directly aimed at eroding trust in the electoral system,” states the NIC report.

Of general note are Iran’s escalation in activities. It stresses that these activities marked a significant escalation from previous election cycles. Tehran’s efforts were particularly aggressive, involving the dissemination of false information aimed at undermining public trust in the electoral process and US institutions.

— The Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2024 Annual Threat Assessment

The unclassified 2024 Annual Threat Assessment report published by the U.S. Intelligence Community on February 5, 2024, and presented before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 11, 2024, highlights the strategic actions of state and non-state actors, transnational criminal organizations (TCO), their military and cyber capabilities, and the broader implications for U.S. and global security. A notable focus is placed on the Middle East, particularly Iran’s regional and global activities, military capabilities, and influence operations, [11].

The threat assessment notes that Iran’s growing cyber capabilities represent a major threat to the security of U.S. and allied networks and data. Its willingness to conduct aggressive cyber operations, including targeting critical infrastructure, underscores this risk while Tehran’s influence operations aim to undermine U.S. political processes, amplify discord, and potentially target U.S. elections, as demonstrated by past activities during the 2020 U.S. presidential and 2022 midterm election cycles, [Ibid].

Specifics on Iran’s cyber operations are provided, including the aggressive and evolving techniques of its cyber actors for influence operations, particularly in anticipation of the U.S. 2024 election. On July 9, 2024 Avril Haines, the Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines on issued a statement on “Recent Iranian Influence Efforts”:

“As I noted in testimony to the Congress in May, Iran is becoming increasingly aggressive in their foreign influence efforts, seeking to stoke discord and undermine confidence in our democratic institutions, as we have seen them do in the past, including in prior election cycles. They continue to adapt their cyber and influence activities, using social media platforms and issuing threats. It is likely they will continue to rely on their intelligence services in these efforts, as well as Iran-based online influencers, to promote their narratives,” wrote Haines, [12].

— Terhan’s Strategic Calculus and Election Interference

The outcome of the Iranian elections impact U.S. foreign policy dynamics and play a non-trivial role in the strategies of both Biden and Trump camps as they approach the 2024 U.S. presidential elections.

Pezeshkian and his foreign policy advisor Zarif were selected by the regime to signal a willingness to engage in diplomacy with Western powers, a strategic feint that aligns with the regimes desire to evade triggering the snapback mechanisms of the JCPOA set to expire in 2025 and a new era of maximum pressure from a Trump administration.

Successful engagement with a pseudo-reformist Iranian government serves to counter Trump’s narrative of needing a hardline approach. If Biden can present a case for successful diplomacy, it weakens Trump’s argument for reapplying maximum pressure, in turn potentially swaying voters who are weary of aggressive foreign policies.

Additionally, polls showed that even before President Biden’s debate-night debacle the center-left showed concern about the Commander in Chief’s ability to handle a complex and dynamic conflict in the Middle East. This reflected broader anxieties about his leadership during international crises, particularly given public perceptions surrounding his age and acuity, which have only amplified since the presidential debate. A conflagration around the elections can therefore be seen as significantly muting President Biden’s prospects of reelection.

This lines up neatly with the regional de-escalation narratives unfolding ahead of the convention in August and the November elections. On July 9, 2024, Al-Khanadiq, a news website linked to the Hezbollah, published a video featuring an interview with Sheikh Naim Qassem, the Deputy Secretary-General of the group where he stated, “We do not want a war, but we will continue to extend support [for Hamas] until the war on Gaza stops. Therefore, any discussion of separating the Lebanese front from Gaza is not objective, and is out of the question for us. Whoever wants to address this situation in the region and in Palestine, must start from Gaza. Stop the war there, and everything will stop,” [13].

A diplomatic resolution to the Gaza conflict and successful engagement with Hezbollah hands the current U.S. administration a victory it can cash in at the ballots in November as David Ignatius noted in his latest opinion piece in the Washington Post last week: “If final agreement could be reached, it would be a ringing validation of President Biden’s patient diplomacy,” [14]. This particular quote presents noteworthy alignment with the Ayatollah’s doctrine of “strategic patience,” unlikely coincidental in nature.

Opinion pieces like Ignatius’ are part of the U.S. administration’s own track II diplomacy efforts to shape the narrative, signal strategic postures and in this case, pressure Israel’s Prime Minister to accept the U.S. administration’s post-conflict strategy aimed as de-escalation. On June 27 Ignatius trotted through immensely complex security dynamics with pomp, offering that “Brett McGurk and Amos Hochstein, the National Security Council’s top Middle East officials, have hammered out a truce deal for Lebanon that officials say could be implemented as soon as there’s a cease-fire in Gaza,” [15].

Notably, from the regime’s standpoint, after their initial hesitation following the presidential debate debacle, leading the Iranian runoff election of July 5, Biden himself does not need to win. Tehran’s leadership has likely assessed that he may be replaced with someone who can beat Trump and have opted to pursue their own strategic imperatives in creating an environment that supports this outcome.

The upshot is that Iran, having secured a measure of leverage over the U.S. elections, can be seen prompting its proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah to provide paths to deescalation ahead of the U.S. elections, thereby positioning themselves to secure favorable conditions with respect to the regime’s nuclear ambitions and their concerns over renewed sanctions. This convergence of interests between Washington and Tehran concerning the U.S. presidential election comes at both the region’s and Israel’s historic expense and should be of considerable concern to the Western public.

With respect to Fassihi’s NYT piece, ultimately, this article is a sophisticated piece of propaganda, designed to soften Western perceptions of the Iranian regime. It falsely signals a willingness for genuine reform and diplomacy, while in reality, the regime continues its repressive and destabilizing actions. Western policymakers and the public must see through this veneer and recognize the enduring threats posed by Iran’s leadership. Zarif and Pezeshkian are a strategic maneuver aimed at influencing US elections, positioning Iran to continue to play games with Western nations with respect to sanctions and their nuclear ambitions.

— Implications

Tehran’s calculated appointment of pseudo-reformist Pezeshkian alongside the regime’s veteran influence operative, Zarif, aims to project a softer diplomatic stance, while its recent efforts at regional deescalation seeks to assist the current U.S. administration to score a diplomatic win pre-election.

What should alarm everyone is not only that the Islamic Republic of Iran is placing their finger on the scales of U.S. Presidential elections leveraging the president’s weaknesses to score a geostrategic imperative, but that the current administration is aligned with Iran in this respect.

At the same time, the situation is equally precarious if Biden (or a potential replacement) should lose. If Iran faces sanctions regardless, it might see escalating hostilities during a U.S. presidential transition—exploiting potential decision-making gaps—as a window of opportunity.

This is a particularly poignant risk in light of the Trump ticket’s increasingly clear stance on the Iranian regime. Yesterday in an interview with Fox at the Republican convention Trump’s new Vice President pick, J. D. Vance asserted, “A lot of people recognize that we need to do something with Iran—but not these weak little bombing runs. If you’re going to punch the Iranians, you punch them hard…”

—— Citations:

1, Foundation for Defense of Democracies: [Iranian President-Elect Pezeshkian Lauds Hamas, Houthi Rebels in Yemen
fdd.org/analysis/2024/…

2, Houthi attacks escalation: Three vessels attacked in Red and Med Sea
by The Editorial Team July 16, 2024
safety4sea.com/houthi-attacks…

3, DETAILS OF IRAN’S STRATEGY OF THINK-TANK ENGAGEMENT CONTINUE TO EMERGE | Iran International and Semafor release undisclosed MoU between the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Iran’s Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) – February 2, 2024
x.com/DanLinnaeus/st…

4, A pseudo-reformist in place signals willingness to engage with DC
x.com/DanLinnaeus/st…

5, On June 4, the E3 countries (France, Germany, and the UK) signaled willingness to trigger the snapback mechanism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) due to Iran’s continued escalation of its nuclear program and non-compliance with the agreement.
x.com/DanLinnaeus/st…

6, Politico: US officials have gathered increasing amount of intel about Iran…
politico.com/news/2024/07/1…

7, Richard Goldberg – @rich_goldberg
“Donald Trump is an existential threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Tehran can deny the plot all it wants. But we already know of active plots against several former Trump officials. And the regime knows maximum pressure will return.”
3:27 PM · Jul 16, 2024
x.com/rich_goldberg/…

8, Jason Brodsky – @JasonMBrodsky
“What has gone unreported here is the history of #Iran’s regime risking mass casualty attacks in its assassination plots. See for example the 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in a Georgetown restaurant that could have killed U.S. officials and others in that same restuarant. There was also the 2018 bomb plot outside Paris that could have killed scores of foreign officials and Iranian dissidents. Thus the Trump rallies may be targets of interest to Tehran.”
7:38 PM · Jul 16, 2024
x.com/JasonMBrodsky/…

9, Overview of Congressional Amendments to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2025 from the June 13, 2024 Congressional Record with Respect to Iran
SUMMARY: x.com/DanLinnaeus/st…
SOURCE PDF: congress.gov/118/crec/2024/…

10, NIC DECLASSIFIED US ELECTION INTERFERENCE REPORT DECEMBER 2023
SUMMARY: x.com/DanLinnaeus/st…
SOURCE PDF: dni.gov/files/ODNI/doc…

11, The unclassified 2024 Annual Threat Assessment report published by the U.S. Intelligence Community on February 5, 2024, and presented before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 11, 2024
SUMMARY: x.com/DanLinnaeus/st…
SOURCE PDF: intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/…

12, ODNI News Release No. 17-24 – July 9, 2024 | Statement from Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines on Recent Iranian Influence Efforts
dni.gov/index.php/news…

13, MEMRI | Lebanese Hizbullah Deputy Secretary-General: Our ‘Institutional Structure’ Makes It Easy To Substitute ‘Martyred’ Commanders – July 9
memri.org/jttm/lebanese-…

14, Opinion A Gaza cease-fire agreement appears within reach
U.S. officials say the framework of a three-stage deal is down to implementation details. By David Ignatius – July 10, 2024
washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/…

15, Washington Post – Opinion | Netanyahu’s rivals tack toward a Gaza ‘day after’ without him
Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s visit to Washington helps repair damage.
By David Ignatius – June 27, 2024
Summary: x.com/DanLinnaeus/st…
Source: washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/…

—— Additional References:

— “Iranian Presidential Candidate Meets Javad Zarif” – Iran International
iranintl.com/en/202406135377

— The Free Press | Inside Iran’s Influence Operation – thefp.com/p/inside-iran-…

— JUNE 7, 2024 FOREIGN PODICY
WHAT AMERICA MISUNDERSTANDS ABOUT THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
Mark Dubowitz Chief Executive @FDD
With Karim Sadjadpour
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
fdd.org/podcasts/2024/…

— Congressional Briefing on Iran’s Covert Influence Operation – OIAC – oiac.org/congressional-…